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Abstract
This paper proposes a theory of competition and customization. When firms al-
locate their production to both custom-made and standardized products, the fraction
of sales from the former will increase in the face of increased competition. Recent
surveys conducted by the World Bank on Chinese firms provide a rare direct mea-
sure of customization that allows us to test the above-mentioned prediction. We find
empirical results consistent with the prediction.
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1 Introduction
We study customization as a strategy firms use to cope with competition. We define cus-
tomization as the costly alteration of a product to tailor it to clients’ needs or tastes. One
can buy a standardized kitchen cabinet which can be functional but does not perfectly fit
the kitchen layout or the tone of the home’s interior design. Alternatively, one can order
a custom-made kitchen cabinet, functional and perfectly matching the interior design.1
We focus on customization because the World Bank Enterprise Surveys suggest that it
is common in manufacturing.2 Specifically, the surveys ask firms the percentage of their
sales made exclusively to clients’ unique specification, with the following remarks: “i.e.
you cannot sell to other clients.” In China, 41.3% of total sales across all 1,511 manufactur-
ing firms surveyed in 2003 (reporting figures for 2002) belongs to customized products.
Of the 1,041 Thai manufacturing firms and 1,080 Malaysian manufacturing firms sur-
veyed in 2007 (reporting figures for 2006), these figures are 44.2% and 39.5%, respectively.
While such a percentage varies considerably across industries, customization is generally
a non-negligible part of any industry.3
In Section 2, we offer a theoretical mechanism through which competition leads to
customization. In a spatial competition model a` la Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979),
competition intensifies when there is an increase in the number of firms because firms
locate closer to one another. What these firms offer, therefore, become less differentiated
in the eyes of the consumers. As such, their price competition intensifies. We show that
such an increase in competition leads to an increase in the fraction of sales from customization.
We also show that if this increased competition is caused by a larger market size, firms
have an even stronger incentive to customize. The intuition is that custom-made products
allow the firm to exercise greater market power over their clients relative to the case where
it only offers a standardized product. Customization, therefore, makes the erosion of the
firm’s profit less dramatic when competition intensifies. Our result remains robust to a
number of alternative modeling assumptions.
1Customization differs from product proliferation. Polo Ralph Lauren, for example, engages in product
proliferation by providing numerous varieties of clothing in color, size, style, etc. More varieties raise the
chance of finding a good match but does not eliminate the chance that consumers do not find the ideal
clothes they desire. Customization refers to tailor-made clothes, in which case the tailor measures the
client’s body for exact sizes and asks about the exact colors and styles that the clients desire.
2The percentage of customized sales out of total sales for an industry or for all manufacturing firms
in a country so reported are calculated as the weighted average of such percentage per firm, where the
weights are the sales of each firm. The more specific surveys from which these figures are calculated are the
Productivity and Investment Climate Study Thailand (PICS-2007), Productivity and Investment Climate
Study Survey 2, Malaysia 2007, and World Bank Investment Climate Survey for China.
3This percentage is higher than 14% for 7 out of 9 manufacturing industries in China.
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In section 3, we use the detailed firm-level information from the World Bank Enter-
prise Survey for China in 2003 (for convenience, we call this the Survey for Chinese En-
terprises; hereafter SCE) to test the prediction that increased competition leads to a larger
share of customized sales. The effect of competition on customization has seldom been
investigated empirically, primarily due to the difficulty of measuring customization.4 The
SCE asks firms about the proportion of their own sales that is custom-made, providing
us a direct measure of customization, which has not been available previously. The SCE
also enables us to measure competition using each firm’s proportion of its competitors’
output that is produced locally.
Consistent with our model, we find increased competition to be significantly associ-
ated with a higher degree of customization. This result is robust to the inclusion of more
controls, using instrumental variable estimation, using fractional logit, outliers, and using
alternative measure of competition. To gauge the economic significance of this result, we
calculate that a one standard deviation increase in our competition measure is associated
with a 7.58% increase in the percentage of custom-made products/services, or 18.72%
relative to the mean of the proportion of customized sales.
Loginova (2010) and Loginova and Wang (2011) have crafted out interesting models
of customization. To model customizing, we follow Loginova and Wang (2011), which
assumes that investing in customization technology allows firms to offer a set of clients
their ideal product varieties. Our model differs from Loginova and Wang in at least three
aspects. First, to focus on customization, we do not consider the case in which one firm’s
product is superior to others in the eyes of all consumers. Second, as data show that firms
sell both customized and standardized products, we extend the notion of customization
in Loginova and Wang to include customization for only a subset of clients. Third, we opt
for Salop’s circumference instead of a Hotelling interval, so as to incorporate endogenous
entry and therefore the level of competition and the ensuing impact on customization.5
The way in which we model customized products is also similar in spirit to Alexandrov’s
(2008) “fat products,” which mean that firms can develop products that cover an interval
in the space of characteristics. Different from Alexandrov, however, our analysis dis-
tinguishes between customized and standardized products and focuses on the effect of
competition on the relative intensity of customization.
It is worth emphasizing that customization is conceptually different from product dif-
4In addition, Holmes and Schmitz (2010) stress the difficulty of measuring competition as well. As we
will discuss in Section 3, our competition measure allows us to circumvent a few common problems of
measuring competition.
5A circumference with uniformly distributed customers makes no location a priori better than another.
Hence, the study of the entry of firms can be more tractable.
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ferentiation. For example, in a spatial competition framework, greater entry usually re-
duces product differentiation, which, in turn, reduces market power and is not in line
with the purpose of customization. Our model makes an explicit distinction between dif-
ferentiation and customization by assuming that a firm, beside choosing its locations in
the product space as an effort to differentiate itself from other firms, can exert extra effort
to customize its product to a set of consumers. We show that under increased competition,
even though firms become less differentiated due to larger entry, their shares of sales from
customized products increase.6
The difficulty of measuring customization may be a reason behind its relatively thin
empirical research. The closest study of ours is Holmes and Stevens (2012), which esti-
mates a structural model in which an industry is divided between a “primary segment”
and a “specialty segment” using confidential plant-level data in the US. Their interpreta-
tion of the specialty segment is that these are plants that produce customized products.
They estimate that “in most industries, more than half of the plants in an industry can be
classified as being specialty segment plants.” This U.S. estimate echoes our descriptive
statistics mentioned earlier that customization accounts for a significant portion in manu-
facturing. Their quantitative results show that in the face of a surge in import competition
(say, from China), the specialty segment tends to grow significantly more important as a
percentage of domestic shipments. They also document the greater survival of plants in
specialty segments relative to those in primary segments in the face of fiercer competition.
These findings are consistent with our theoretical and empirical results that competition
tends to drive up the relative importance of customization. An important message of
their study is that there seem to be systematic differences between customized and stan-
dardized production, and these differences can have deep economic implications, such as
those on theories of firm heterogeneity.7
Our paper complements Holmes and Stevens (2012) in two ways. First, instead of
assuming that a plant makes either a standardized or custom-made product, firms in our
model can produce both standardized and custom-made products. In other words, firms
decide their relative intensity of customization. Second, even though they find some
6The discussion here pertains to the distinction between customization and horizontal product differen-
tiation. It is interesting to note that Shaked and Sutton (1982) have shown that quality (vertical) differenti-
ation can help to relax price competition.
7They show that specialty segment plants are generally smaller, more numerous, and geographically
more diffuse, and ship more locally. In the face of fiercer import competition, standard theories of firm het-
erogeneity predict that large plants are more robust to competition, as they have higher productivity. Their
results show that large plants are the hardest hit by competition, rather than the small plants predicted by
standard theories. Hence, their results show that it is important to look beyond productivty for explaining
firm heterogeneity, and customization is one important dimension as it explains the facts well.
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relatively direct evidence of customization in a few industries, they fall short of making
a direct link between customization and specialty segments for all industries. In contrast,
our data allow us to measure and study customization directly.
Also related is Mazzeo (2002) who empirically examines the motels along interstate
highways in the US and finds that motels within larger clusters (thus facing greater com-
petition) have incentives to reduce competition through different product choices (differ-
ent in quality). This paper differs from Mazzeo (2002) in at least two ways. First, we
examine customization per se, whereas the product choice examined by Mazzeo is more
of product differentiation. Second, we go beyond a particular industry to demonstrate
that our prediction generally holds among several manufacturing industries.
2 A Theory of Competition and Customization
In this section, we use a model to illustrate how competition affects customization. Our
model is a Hotelling/Salop type of spatial competition model with a possibility to cus-
tomize. As is typical in such models, we assume uniformly distributed consumers on
a unit circumference, and hence each consumer is an atom-less agent whose unilateral
action does not affect the market outcome. In Section 2.3, we show that the result of
the model remains robust to modeling assumption that include large clients and a richer
bargaining framework between them and firms.
2.1 Model Setup
Consider a market in which each product i is characterized by xi ∈ (0, 1] on a circumfer-
ence. There is a continuum of clients of total mass D and according to their ideal varieties
x ∈ (0, 1] distributed uniformly on the circumference. A client of type x derives utility
v − td(x− xi)− pi from buying one unit of product i, where v is a positive constant, t is a
taste parameter, pi is the price of product i, and d(x− xi) is the distance between x and xi
on the circumference.8 We assume that v is sufficiently large that all clients find a product
that yields a positive payoff in equilibrium.9
8We follow the literature by considering the case that the consumers know their ideal varieties when
they order customized products. The same treatment is also taken in Loginova (2010), Loginova and Wang
(2011), Dewan, Jing, and Seidmann (2003), Bernhardt, Liu, and Serfes (1995), Mendelson and Parlaktu¨rk
(2008), and Syam, Ruan, and Hess (2005). As far as we know, only Syam, Krishnamurthy, and Hess (2008)
consider the relatively new type of customization sales in which consumers may have no clue what they
want prior to the customization sales.
9Note that the model does not impose any restriction on the number of attributes across which firms’
products can differ. Cabral (2000) gives examples showing that if a product consists of multiple attributes
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There is a large number of ex ante identical potential entrants. Each entrant pays an
entry cost φ. As in Salop (1979) and Syverson (2004), we assume that all entering firms
are evenly spaced; with n firms, each firm is 1/n distance away from its two neighboring
firms.10 For ease of presentation, assume that each firm operates with a zero marginal
cost of production.11 Suppose that the closest firms to a client of type x are firm A to the
left and firm B to the right. Hence the utility that x enjoys from buying the standardized
products of firmA and firmB is v−td (x, xA)−pGA and v−t( 1n−d (x, xA))−pGB, respectively.
Investing in product-customization technology allows a firm to sell clients their ideal
varieties beyond the firm’s location. That is, if a client who is located at x is offered a cus-
tomized product with price p, the client’s utility from the product is v−p. Given the same
price p, the utility from a standardized product from firm i is v− td (x, xi)−p. Consuming
a customized product increases the consumer’s utility by td (x, xi) relative to consuming
a standardized one. Customized products, therefore, can in principle be sold at higher
prices relative to their standardized counterparts. We denote s to be a firm’s customization
scope if it can produce a customized product for every client up to a distance of s away (on
both sides) from its location. For each firm i, choosing customization scope si ≥ 0 costs
C (si) =
∫ si
0
c (x) dx, where c (x) is the fixed cost of customization for a customer per se
who is x distance from the firm. Assume that c(·) is differentiable, strictly increasing, and
strictly convex and that c (0) = 0. That is, the cost of customization increases in distance at
a rate that is faster than a linear one (i.e., increasing marginal cost in distance). For clients
beyond a distance of si away from firm i, however, the firm can sell only a standardized
product. Firms set prices for the customized clients individually instead of applying a
uniform price.
The game involves three stages.
Stage 1 (entry): potential entrants decide whether to enter.
Stage 2 (customization): firms simultaneously decide their own customization scope.
that are all vertically differentiated, the product itself can be horizontally differentiated where customers’
preferences towards the different varieties differ. Cabral (2000, p. 206) states, “most, if not all, real-world
examples combine elements of horizontal and vertical product differentiation. In fact, whenever products
are defined by more than one characteristic, even if consumers agree that more of each characteristic is
better (vertical differentiation), insofar as different consumers value different characteristics differently, we
have a case of horizontal product differentiation.”
10A micro-foundation for Salop’s even spacing is provided by Vogel (2008), who shows that mixed-
strategy pricing in an auxiliary game can eliminate the possibility of firms undercutting their opponents
on price. Under this setup, with the same marginal cost, firms choose to be equi-distant from neighboring
firms.
11In the Appendix, we show that a positive marginal cost does not alter the main results.
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Stage 3 (pricing): with their previous decisions as common knowledge, firms simultane-
ously choose prices. Customers decide which products to purchase, and profits are
realized.
We use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium. Our data
shows that firms sell both customized and standardized products. Accordingly, we as-
sume that c (s) increases in s sufficiently fast such that c
(
1
2n
)
> Dt
2n
holds. As will be
explained, the condition that c
(
1
2n
)
> Dt
2n
, together with other above-mentioned condi-
tions on c, ensures that the optimal si is unique and si ∈
(
0, 1
2n
)
. Because si < 12n , no two
competing neighboring firms’ customization scopes overlap, and some consumers must
purchase standardized products.
2.2 Analysis
2.2.1 Pricing
Given n evenly spaced firms and customization investments si, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, we can
solve the pricing decisions by looking at a Hotelling duopoly problem in which two firms,
A and B, are located at the two end points of [0, 1/n].12
Customer x ∈ [sA, 1n − sB] chooses between the two firms in buying a standardized
product, i.e., max
{
v − tx− pGA, v − t
(
1
n
− x)− pGB}. A client of type x˜ who is indifferent
between the two choices is given by
x˜ =
1
2n
− p
G
A − pGB
2t
. (1)
Note that, for now, x˜ in the above formula may be outside the interval [sA, 1n − sB]. We
show that, indeed, x˜ ∈ [sA, 1n − sB] shortly.
For a client x ∈ [0, sA], in addition to the choice of two standardized products from
A and B, she can also buy the customized product offered by firm A. Her problem
becomes max
{
v − tx− pGA, v − t
(
1
n
− x)− pGB, v − pxA} . Having sunk customization in-
vestment C (sA), firm A would set price pxA = min
{
tx+ pGA, t
(
1
n
− x)+ pGB} to capture the
sales from [0, sA]. In equilibrium, pxA = tx + p
G
A. In other words, the firm’s pricing of its
customized product is constrained by the price of its own standardized product. To see
12d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) show that equilibrium may not exist in the pricing stage
if the distance between two neighboring firms is so close that undercutting the price of neighboring firms is
optimal. This issue arises in Salop’s setup if n is too large or t is too small. To avoid this problem, we assume
a sufficiently large t or a sufficiently large entry cost φ, such that n is small. An alternative is to resort to
the possibility of mixed-strategy pricing in the auxiliary game proposed by Vogel (2008), who proves the
existence of a pure-strategy price equilibrium under such a possibility.
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this, suppose on the contrary that t
(
1
n
− x) + pGB < tx + pGA, which implies that x˜ < sA,
and all clients in (sA, 1n ] will purchase products from firm B. As long as x˜ < sA, increas-
ing pGB would benefit B because the clients in (sA,
1
n
] will continue to buy from it. Thus,
equilibrium price pGB must satisfy the condition that x˜ ≥ sA, which, in turn, means that
t
(
1
n
− x) + pGB ≥ tx + pGA for all x ∈ [0, sA]. Hence, pxA = tx + pGA. A similar argument for
firm B implies that x˜ ≤ 1
n
− sB, implying that x˜ ∈ [sA, 1n − sB].
Assume that the market size (or indeed the density) D = 1 for ease of exposition. We
will make D a general number when we discuss the impact of market size. Using (1), we
write firm A’s profit as a function of pGA and p
G
B:
piA(p
G
A; p
G
B) = (x˜− sA) pGA +
∫ sA
0
pxAdx,
=
(
1
2n
− p
G
A − pGB
2t
− sA
)
pGA +
∫ sA
0
(
tx+ pGA
)
dx, (2)
=
(
1
2n
− p
G
A − pGB
2t
)
pGA +
∫ sA
0
txdx. (3)
This expression implies that customization, or the lack thereof, has no effect on how op-
timal price pGA is determined, given p
G
B. The first-order condition for p
G
A is the same as
that for a standard Hotelling problem, which is also the case for pGB. These solutions are
p̂GA
(
pGB
)
= t
2n
+
pGB
2
and p̂GB
(
pGA
)
= t
2n
+
pGA
2
. Thus, the equilibrium price pair is
(
t
n
, t
n
)
, and
x˜ = 1
2n
.
2.2.2 Customization stage
Plugging equilibrium price pair
(
t
n
, t
n
)
into (2), the equilibrium profit of firm i from in-
vesting C (si) is thus
pii (si) =
(
1
2n
− si
)
t
n
+
ts2i
2
+
tsi
n
− C (si) (4)
=
t
2n2
+
ts2i
2
− C (si) . (5)
The optimal customization scope, s∗i , satisfies ts∗i = C ′ (s∗i ) = c (s∗i ). This condition says
that the cost of customizing for the marginal consumer, s∗i , equals the the gains from
customization, ts∗i . Since c′ (0) < t, c (s) < ts holds in a neighborhood of 0. Thus, si = 0
is never optimal. That c increases fast enough so that that c( 1
2n
) > t
2n
implies that an s∗i
satisfying ts∗i = c (s∗i ) exists. That c is strictly convex guarantees the uniqueness of s∗i .
Does increased competition lead to a larger share of sales from customization? Divid-
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ing the sum of the second and third terms by that of the first three terms in (4) gives the
share of sales from customization:
r =
s2in
2 + 2nsi
s2in
2 + 1
, (6)
which is strictly increasing in n. Increasing n intensifies price competition. The result-
ing low prices decrease the sales of both the customized and standardized products, but
disproportionately more so for the sales of the standardized products. To see this, no-
tice that the second term in (4) does not depend on n. In other words, the sales of cus-
tomized products are more robust to increased competition precisely because firms can
price-discriminate each of the clients offered customized products.
The optimal customization scope, s∗i , gives an alternative way to see how increased
competition leads to a larger share of sales from customization. Since s∗i is such that ts∗i =
c (s∗i ), the optimal customization scope does not depend on n. Meanwhile, as n increases,
the number of clients still buying standardized products, 1
n
− 2s∗i , necessarily decreases,
or, put differently, the proportion of clients offered customized products, 2s∗i /(
1
n
) = 2ns∗i ,
necessarily increases.
2.2.3 Market size and customization
What induces an increase in competition? We offer one potential reason: a larger market.
RelaxD = 1 to a generalD > 0. As is standard, increasingD weakly increases the number
of firms n (weakly because n is an integer number). We omit these uninteresting details,
and simply denote such a relation by n∗(D), knowing that it is weakly increasing in D
and the number of entrants depends on the entry cost φ.
As the magnitude of D does not affect pricing, the profit of firm i in the customization
stage is
pii(si) = D
{[
1
2n∗(D)
− si
]
t
n∗(D)
+
ts2i
2
+
tsi
n
}
− C (si) (7)
= D
[
t
2 [n∗(D)]2
+
ts2i
2
]
− C (si) .
The first-order condition is
Dts∗i = c (s
∗
i ) . (8)
Hence, the optimal customization scope, denoted by s∗i (D), must be strictly increasing
in D. Similar to the arguments above, the condition c( 1
2n
) > Dt
2n
, together with other
8
conditions on c, ensures that a unique s∗i (D) ∈
(
0, 1
2n
)
exists. The formula for the share
of sales from customization from (7) is the same as (6), except that now n = n∗(D) and
si = s
∗
i (D). Increasing D raises n∗, which leads to a larger r if there is no change in s∗i ,
for the same reason discussed previously. In addition, because s∗i also increases in D, the
increase in r is even larger. We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (a) An exogenous increase in competition, i.e., an increase in the number of firms
n, leads to a larger share of sales from customization, r, whereas each firm i’s customization scope
s∗i remains unchanged, which also implies that the proportion of clients offered customized prod-
ucts, 2ns∗i , increases in n. (b) An endogenous increase in competition induced by a larger market
size D leads to both a larger share of sales from customization, r, and larger customization scope,
s∗i .
These results are robust to alternative assumptions in three different parts of the model.
We sketch the main intuitions below and delegate detailed proofs and discussions to the
Appendix.
Instead of zero variable costs, we can easily incorporate positive variable costs. Sup-
pose that the marginal cost is a constant a + δ ≥ 0, where a ≥ 0 is the marginal cost of
producing standardized products, and δ ≥ 0 allows for the possibility that customized
products are more costly to produce. As such, the equilibrium price pair for the stan-
dardized products increases from
(
t
n
, t
n
)
to
(
t
n
+ a, t
n
+ a
)
. The customized price remains
tx above the standardized price, i.e., pxA = p
G
A + tx, leaving the customization benefit
unchanged at tx. As the customization scope is determined by the location s∗i such that
the customization benefit equals to the customization cost, the corresponding equation
changes from ts∗i = c (s∗i ) to ts∗i = c (s∗i ) + δ. Whereas the existence of δ > 0 reduces the
incentive to customize, the number of firms n is still not involved in the determination of
s∗i . Hence, Proposition 1 continues to hold.
We have assumed that firms first make their customization decisions before pricing.
Suppose they make their customization and pricing decision at the same time. For firm
A, this means subtracting C (sA) from (3), and firm A chooses pGA and sA simultaneously
to maximize piA(pGA, sA; p
G
B). The first-order conditions remain the same, and so do all the
results. This is because the first-order conditions for s∗i do not involve the standardized
prices. The customization benefit (tx) and cost (c (x)) only depend on the distance x but
not on the standardized prices or the number of firms n. Similar logic applies to the case
in which the customization decision is made after the pricing stage.
Rather than assuming price-taking consumers, suppose firms and their customers en-
gage in Nash bargaining. Buying the standardized product becomes customers’ disagree-
ment outcome. The gains from a customization deal are tx. Suppose the firm’s bargaining
9
power is β ∈ (0, 1). Then, pxA = pGA + βtx. All results continue to hold, and the model is
simply a case in which β → 1.
2.3 An Alternative Model: Large Client and Bargaining
2.3.1 Setup
In some cases of customization, large consumers can be first movers in the market, shop-
ping among those firms that could potentially accommodate them, with price being ne-
gotiated in the process. We offer an alternative model to consider this scenario.
Assume that there is a single large client with demand D > 0 located at x ∈ [0, 1).
This large client can also be interpreted as a mass of clients each demanding one unit, and
they act collectively. For tractability, we focus on this large client and assume no other
consumers.13 Assume that entrants do not know about the exact location of x before
they enter. Since firms do not know the location of the clients, even spacing of firms
still applies. After entry, the firms learn about the exact location of x.14 Without loss of
generality, suppose that x ∈ [0, 1
2n
]
, where the firm at 0 is called firm A and that at 1
n
firm
B. When there is a locational advantage of a firm, i.e., x < 1
2n
, then this firm is generically
called A. The large client can choose one of the firms to negotiate a deal on a customized
product. If a deal is reached and executed, then the game ends, and if not, then firms
will offer standardized products to the large client, as in the basic model. The rest of the
model setup remains the same. Below is the game’s timeline.
Stage 1: Potential entrants simultaneously decide whether to enter. To enter, an entrant
has to pay an entry cost φ.
Stage 2: The large client chooses one firm to negotiate a deal on a customized product.
The game ends if a deal is agreed (and then executed) by both parties. Otherwise,
the game goes on to the next stage.
Stage 3: Firms simultaneously decide their prices for their standardized products, and
the large client decides from whom to purchase a standardized product.
We use Nash’s bargaining solution. We present the main arguments and results; the
Appendix contains the detailed proofs and discussions.
13The model will lose significant tractability when we combine this large client with uniformly dis-
tributed small clients.
14That firms do not know x before they enter reflects the uncertainty of the consumer’s actual preference
that firms face. It is also made to justify the even spacing of firms, as the location choice of firms is not the
focus of our analysis.
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2.3.2 Analysis
In Stage 3, given prices pGi , i ∈ {A,B}, the large client’s utility of purchasing from A and
B are D
(
v − tx− pGA
)
and D
[
v − t ( 1
n
− x)− pGB], respectively. This implies a price war
between two firms in a Bertrand fashion. In equilibrium, the client purchases from A,
pGA = t
(
1
n
− 2x), and firm A’s profit is piGA = Dt ( 1n − 2x).
In Stage 2, whatever can be achieved by bargaining with firm B can be achieved by
bargaining with firm A. In equilibrium, bargaining only occurs between the large client
and firm A. In any customization deal, c (x) has to be paid by firm A, and the large
client can obtain a utility of D (v − pxA). As the disagreement outcome is given by Stage
3’s equilibrium outcome, Nash’s bargaining solution is given by the pxA that gives each
player half of the total gains from customization,15 that is,
D (v − pxA)−D
(
v − tx− pGA
)
=
1
2
[
Dv −D (v − tx− pGA)− c (x)− piGA] = 12 [Dtx− c (x)] .
Thus, pxA =
c(x)
2D
+ t
2
(
2
n
− 3x). Such a deal involving pxA will only be reached if and only if
the total gains from customization are nonnegative, i.e., if and only if c (x) ≤ Dtx.
Given n firms and realization of x, the large client either purchases a customized prod-
uct or a standardized one, depending on whether c (x) ≤ Dtx holds. The realizations of
the random variable x, however, can be interpreted as different (niche) markets or a mar-
ket at different times. Thus, we exploit this nature to proxy the share of customized sales
by the expected sales of customized products relative to the total expected sales. Without
prior information of x and with even spacing, x is uniformly distributed on
[
0, 1
2n
]
with
density f (x) = 2n. Let xˆ be such that c (xˆ) = Dtxˆ (note its similarity to (8)), and recall
that c increases in x fast enough so that xˆ < 1
2n
. The share of customized sales r is
r =
∫ xˆ
0
pxADf (x) dx∫ 1
2n
xˆ
pGADf (x) dx+
∫ xˆ
0
pxADf (x) dx
=
1
2Dt
∫ xˆ
0
c (x) dx+ xˆ
n
− 3xˆ2
4(
1
2n
− xˆ)2 + 1
2Dt
∫ xˆ
0
c (x) dx+ xˆ
n
− 3xˆ2
4
.
Proposition 2. (a) An exogenous increase in competition, i.e., an increase in the number of firms
n, leads to a larger expected share of sales from customization, r. (b) Suppose that c (x) = xb for
any b > 1. Then, an endogenous increase in competition induced by a larger market size D leads
to a larger expected share of sales from customization, r.
For result (b), the functional form assumption is a sufficient condition made for tractabil-
ity. That b > 1 is consistent with c being strictly convex.
15Here, we assume equal bargaining power between the firm and the client. It is a straightforward exer-
cise to extend this to a general bargaining power.
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3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data and Background
3.1.1 Data
Our empirical analysis draws on data from the Survey for Chinese Enterprises (SCE),
which was carried out by the World Bank in cooperation with the Enterprise Survey
Organization of China in early 2003. For balanced representation, the SCE covered 18
prefecture-level cities in five geographic regions of China: Benxi, Changchun, Dalian,
and Harbin in the Northeastern region; Hangzhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen, and Wenzhou in
the Coastal region; Changsha, Nanchang, Wuhan, and Zhengzhou in the Central region;
Chongqing, Guiyang, Kunming, and Nanning in the Southwestern region; and Lanzhou
and Xi’an in the Northwestern region.
In each of these cities, the SCE randomly sampled 100 or 150 firms from nine manufac-
turing industries (garments and leather products, electronic equipment, electronic parts
making, household electronics, auto and auto parts, food processing, chemical products
and medicine, biotech products and Chinese medicine, and metallurgical products) and
five service industries (transportation services, information technology, accounting and
non-banking financial services, advertising and marketing, and business services). A to-
tal of 2,400 enterprises were surveyed.
The SCE contains two parts. The first is a general questionnaire directed at senior
management that seeks information about the enterprise, such as degree of innovation,
product certification, marketing, relations with suppliers and customers, access to mar-
kets and technology, relations with government, labor force, infrastructure, involvement
in international trade, finance, and taxation, and information on the CEO and board of
directors. The second questionnaire is directed at accountants and personnel managers
and covers ownership, various financial measures, and labor and training. Most of the
information in the first part of the SCE pertains to the survey year, 2002, whereas that in
the second part pertains to the 2000-2002 period.
As service industries are largely localized and customized, we focus here on the man-
ufacturing firms in the SCE. There are 1,566 manufacturing firms, but 55 of them did not
report customized sales.
3.1.2 Background and Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 reports the total customized sales as a percentage of total sales in the entire sam-
ple, in each industry, and in each city. This is calculated as the weighted mean of each
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Table 1: Customization Across Cities and Industries
Custom-Share Custom-Mean Obs.
Entire Sample 0.413 0.406 1,511
Industry
Garment & leather products 0.343 0.488 345
Electronic equipment 0.690 0.358 178
Electronic parts making 0.468 0.418 271
Household electronics 0.346 0.355 61
Auto & auto parts 0.226 0.450 348
Food processing 0.148 0.149 67
Chemical products & medicine 0.099 0.234 58
Biotech products & Chinese medicine 0.061 0.140 28
Metallurgical products (manuf.&tools) 0.650 0.408 155
City
Benxi 0.428 0.391 62
Changchun 0.267 0.536 100
Changsha 0.248 0.346 100
Chongqing 0.139 0.305 100
Dalian 0.690 0.558 61
Guiyang 0.206 0.320 83
Harbin 0.095 0.513 99
Hangzhou 0.374 0.421 65
Jiangmen 0.307 0.398 66
Kunming 0.141 0.332 94
Lanzhou 0.590 0.381 96
Nanchang 0.237 0.531 97
Nanning 0.209 0.211 62
Shenzhen 0.783 0.519 62
Wenzhou 0.167 0.358 66
Wuhan 0.335 0.346 99
Xi’an 0.505 0.411 99
Zhengzhou 0.499 0.431 100
Source: Authors’ calculations with SCE data.
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firm’s such percentage with weights being each firm’s sales and shown under the column
Custom-Share. Table 1 also reports the unweighted mean under the column Custom-
Mean. In the entire sample, 41.3% of total sales is custom-made. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, Thailand and Malaysia have similar figures among their manufacturing firms.
There can be important difference in customization between developed countries and
developing ones. Suppose that manufacturing firms in the US and China form a supply
chain in which Chinese firms are largely upstream and American firms are largely down-
stream. In the US, as shown by Holmes and Stevens (2012), customization is an important
part of consumer goods production. However, a standardized consumer good in the US
may require upstream manufacturing firms in China to tailor their production to provide
suitable parts for such a standardized good sold in the US. This is especially true where
there is significant product proliferation in the consumer goods in the US. This then im-
plies that customization could be much more profound and widespread in developing
countries, if such countries are deeply involved in the supply chains.
While we do not have data to support the above conjecture, the MIT Smart Customiza-
tion Group (SCG), an MIT-Industry collaboration, gives a similar perspective on the im-
portance and role of customization in China. The SCG hosts a large-scale conference on
customization every two years. The importance of customization in China’s manufac-
turing can be shown by their choice of locations; both the first and the third conference
took place in China, that is, in Hong Kong in 2001 and in Hong Kong and Hangzhou in
2005. Frank Piller, a faculty of SCG, summarizes the 2005 conference with the following
description on China, “most often, China is however discussed in western countries as a
manufacturing place for custom goods. While there is a large debate if logistic disadvan-
tages would not favor local manufacturing of custom goods close to the markets, several
western brands are sourcing the custom goods from China: Most custom sneakers and
fashion shoes are produced in Guangzhou for the US and European market, Also, several
large US brands like Nordstorm, Polo Ralph Lauren or Tommy Hilfinger are producing
some of their custom garments in China. This trend may increase.” Their 2005 conference
includes visits to Chinese firms such as Youngor (customized shirt manufacturer), Hong
Hua (customized fabric manufacturer), and Ai Ke Software (customized CAD systems).16
Table 1 shows that the percentage of customized sales differs significantly across in-
dustries and across cities. For example, Garment & Leather Products, Auto & Auto Parts,
and Metallurgical Products industries exhibit a higher degree of customization, while
much less customization has been found in the Food Processing and Biotech & Chinese
Medicine industries. These results are consistent with our intuition; the products in the
16The data source is www.mcpc2005.com.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Custom-made 1,511 0.406 0.419 0 1
Competition 1,507 0.273 0.337 0 1
Firm characteristics
Firm Size 1,563 5.040 1.453 0 9.899
Firm Age 1,566 2.494 0.777 1.099 3.970
Private Ownership 1,566 0.796 0.389 0 1
Labor Productivity 1,332 3.503 1.574 -3.761 11.150
Skilled Labor 1,542 0.026 0.060 0 1
CEO characteristics
CEO Education 1,553 15.359 2.511 0 19
CEO Tenure 1,548 6.240 4.580 1 33
Deputy CEO Previously 1,548 0.280 0.449 0 1
Government Cadre Previously 1,548 0.036 0.185 0 1
Party Member 1,524 0.648 0.478 0 1
Government-appointed 1,544 0.243 0.429 0 1
Instrumental variable
Local Clients 1,542 0.331 0.362 0 1
Local Suppliers 1,541 0.373 0.349 0 1
Additional controls
Clients’ Duration Dummies
<1 yr 1,549 0.039 0.193 0 1
1 to 2 yrs 1,549 0.073 0.260 0 1
2 to 3 yrs 1,549 0.125 0.331 0 1
3 to 4 yrs 1,549 0.126 0.332 0 1
>4 yrs 1,549 0.637 0.481 0 1
Custom-made Component 1444 0.068 0.221 0 1
Source: Authors’ calculations with SCE data.
former three industries are quite differentiated (or, quite a large degree of product pro-
liferation) whereas those in the latter two are rather homogeneous. Inland cities (like
Nanning, Chongqing, Guiyang) also witness a lower degree of customization than do
coastal cities (like Dalian, Shenzhen, Harbin), where firms there generally face more in-
tense competition than do firms in inland cities. The case of Shenzhen is particularly
interesting, as it is a well-known manufacturing base in China, and it has the highest per-
centage of customized sales, at 78.3%, among all cities in the sample. We also calculate
the correlation coefficient between a city’s customization share reported in Table 1 and a
city’s road distance to the nearest large sea ports, and this number is −0.43.17 All these
seem to suggest that there may be an important link between trade and customization
due to the above-mentioned supply chain rationale.
In Table 2, we report summary statistics for an array of variables that will be used in
our empirical analysis. The first two variables, Custom-made and Competition, are the main
focus of the empirical analysis. As mentioned, Custom-made is measured by a firm’s per-
centage of customized sales, where as Competition is measured as each firm’s proportion
17For this calculation, we pick the largest six sea ports in China; Shanghai, Hong Kong, Ningbo, Qingdao,
Tianjin, and Dalian. Shenzhen is also a very big port, but location is very near Hong Kong.
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of its competitors’ output that is produced locally. The large standard deviations of these
variables across firms suggests that there are substantial variations from which to draw
inferences.
3.2 Empirical approach
We test whether increased competition leads to a larger share of sales from customized
products by estimating the following equation:
Custom-madefic = α + β · Competitionfic + Z
′
ficγ + υfic, (9)
where f , i, and c index firm, industry, and city, respectively.
The measure of our dependent variable, Custom-madefic, comes from the SCE’s ques-
tion about the percentage of a firm’s sales made to clients’ unique specifications (i.e., its
sales of products that cannot be sold to other clients).18
We make two remarks on our measure.19 First, it would have been ideal if all sur-
veyed firms conceive that, if not for a particular customer, that product would not have
been produced based on the survey’s specific remark: “cannot sell to other clients.” We,
however, cannot entirely rule out the possibility that it may have been some long-term
commitments between the firm and its clients that prevent its products, even standard-
ized, from being sold to other clients. This problem, if serious but random, would con-
taminate our measure by making our dependent variable more noisy, biasing against us
by making it harder to find any significant relationship between the dependent variable
and our regressor of interest. Nevertheless, in our estimation, we include a variable indi-
cating whether a firm has signed any contracts with its clients to partially control for the
long-term commitments issue.20
Second, product customization involves a relatively new approach where customers
are actively involved in the product design. Thomke and Hippel (2002), for instance, ex-
amine this relatively new approach to production. Syam, Krishnamurthy, and Hess (2008)
provide an explicit model of the situation in which customers are uncertain about their
own preferences. They show that if customers anticipate their regret on their customized
products, firms would change their product strategies. The famous businessman, Richard
18The exact words in the World Bank survey are: “What percent of your sales are made to your clients’
unique specification (i.e. you cannot sell to other clients)?”
19We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting these two remarks.
20Alternatively, we have also estimated using a sub-sample of firms without signing any contracts with
their clients (in which case the long-term commitments issue is less prominent) and find similar results
(available upon request).
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Branson (2012), in his new book, also shares his view on the fact that many customers do
not know what they want. A great business is to help customers find out what they want.
In theory, we incorporate neither the new type of product design involving the customers,
nor customers being not certain about their own preferences. In our measure, however,
we cannot rule out customization with active customer involvement, or uncertain prefer-
ences.
The regressor of interest, Competitionfic, concerns market competition. In the model,
any rivals locating closer to the firm intensifies price competition and toughens competi-
tion. If a client walks away from a potential deal with a firm, how easy is it for her to find
another firm to buy from? If there are plenty of rivals offering similar products located
within a close distance, price competition should be intense. We capture such a notion of
market competition by the percentage of competitors’ output produced within the same
city.21 Consider two polar cases. If a firm reports that all their competitors produce in
other cities, the firm’s clients would find it challenging to find another nearby firm to buy
from. In contrast, if a firm reports that all their competitors produce within the city, the
firm’s clients would find it relatively easier. Price competition would be more intense in
the latter than in the former.
This proximity of rivals leading to increased competition argument can be made in-
dependent of the locations of the clients.22 The reason is that location is one of the many
attributes of the product offered by a firm. Holding constant the distribution of the prod-
uct attributes among firms, the closer they are located, the more competition they face
because their products are becoming more “similar” at least in the location attribute.
Within our theoretical model, that also means that firms are located closer to each other,
and therefore less differentiated in the eyes of the potential clients. Nonetheless, in all the
regressions, we include industry dummies, which helps us control for the heterogeneity
in transportation and hence the geographic distribution of product market across indus-
tries. Furthermore, we conduct a robustness check by focusing on a sub-sample of firms
whose main market is located locally (i.e., the same city).
Our measure of competition circumvents two problems. First, the intensity of compe-
tition hinges on who a firm is competing with. The key questions concern: (a) how com-
petent are the rivals; and (b) how available are competent rivals to the firm’s potential
clients. The number of firms and market concentration can at best only partially capture
21The exact words in the World Bank survey are, “considering all your competitors, what percentage (in
terms of output) have located their plants: (1) In the same district as your plant; (2) Outside your district
but in the same city area as your plant.” Our measure is the sum of these two percentages.
22We thank an anonymous referee for mentioning clients’ locations, which inspired us to think further on
their relation to our competition measure.
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the answers to these key questions. Demsetz (1995) argues that unless one is willing to
impose a Cournot-type competitive environment, the number of firms in an industry can
only poorly reflect the intensity of competition. Holmes and Schmitz (2010) show how the
lifting of entry barriers can lead to an increase in market concentration, making increased
competition positively, but not negatively, related to market concentration. While it is
related to market concentration and the number of firms within an industry, our compe-
tition measure directly connects to the ease of a firm’s potential clients in finding another
nearby rivals.
Second, tackling firm heterogeneity necessitates a firm-level analysis, as opposed to
an industry-level analysis. Measuring competition thus requires firm-level variation,
a unique feature possible in our competition measure. Conducting estimation at the
industry-level cannot avoid the implicit assumption that every firm within an industry
faces the same level of competition, a strong and unrealistic assumption sensitive to how
industries are categorized and the degree of firm asymmetry.
Our measure comes with its own shortcomings. Unlike the total number of firms in
the same industry and city used in Holmes and Stevens (2002) and Henderson (2003),
which can be measured objectively, our measure is subjective. Arguably, a firm’s answer
(with regard to customization) is based on its perception of the competition. As long as
firms in the same industry and city potentially face different degrees of competition (e.g.,
large versus small firms), our subjective measure is able to capture this heterogeneity in
responses. However, it may suffer from the problem of idiosyncratic observational error
or misreporting. We detail our approach to tackle this measurement error problem later
in this section. We also experiment with an objective measure (i.e., the total employment
of other firms in the same industry within the same city) as a robustness check.
To deal with the possible heteroskedasticity, we cluster the standard errors at the
industry-city level.
3.2.1 Omitted variables
It is plausible that Competitionfic is correlated with the error term εfic, thus biasing the
estimation of β. One prominent set of omitted variables includes industrial differences,
such as differences in entry barriers (e.g., φ), customization technology (e.g., si), and taste
(e.g., t). To address this concern, we include industry dummies in the estimation. We also
include city dummies to account for any potential city differences. To further control for
variations across industries within a city, we saturate the estimation model with industry-
city dummies.
Another prominent set of omitted variables encompasses those related to firm capa-
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bility. Picone, Ridley, and Zandbergen (2009) show that firms with a greater ability to
differentiate their products are more likely to cluster strategically. To single out the effect
of competition on customization, we control for a list of firm23 and CEO characteristics
commonly used in the literature.24 To avoid the “bad control” problem, we employ the
lagged values of these variables, as in the regression, wherever possible (Angrist and Pis-
chke, 2009).
3.2.2 Instrumental variables
Being subjective makes our competition measure prone to measurement error. Theoreti-
cally, it is difficult to say whether and why firms in more competitive environments are
more (or less) likely to misreport the degree of competition. The long list of controls
in the regression analysis may allow us to control for certain systematic patterns in the
measurement error across firms, although the existence of the white-noise type of mea-
surement error may drive the estimated coefficient β towards zero against any significant
findings. We resort to the instrumental variable approach to address this measurement
error problem, which also further addresses concerns over omitted variables. We use two
instruments.
We show in Section 2.2.3 that increasing the number of consumers indirectly leads to
a larger share of sales from customized products through toughening competition (see
equation (6)). To see the intuition, consider the classic Hotelling model with two firms
locating at the end of a Hotelling interval. The location of the marginal client reflects their
pricing strategies, which in turn hinge on how close the two firms are (or how differentiate
they are) but not how many clients they are competing for. If taking into account the fixed
entry cost, a larger group of clients makes an additional firm believe that it is profitable
to enter the market. The degree of differentiation among the three firms would change.
Price competition becomes tougher not directly because of the increase in the client base,
23The variables related to firm characteristics include Firm Size (measured by the logarithm of 2001 total
employment), Firm Age (measured by the logarithm of years of establishment), Private Ownership (measured
by the share of equity owned by private parties in 1999), Labor Productivity (measured by the logarithm
of output per worker in 2001), Skilled Labor (measured by the share of workers in 2001 who dealt with
advanced technology), and Client Contract (a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has signed any
contracts with its clients).
24The variables concerning CEO characteristics are his or her human capital, including CEO Education
(years of schooling), CEO Tenure (years of being CEO), and Deputy CEO Previously (a dummy variable in-
dicating whether the CEO was the firm’s deputy CEO before he or she became its CEO), and political
capital, including Government Cadre Previously (a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO was a gov-
ernment official before he or she became CEO), Party Member (a dummy variable indicating whether the
CEO is a member of the Chinese Communist Party), and Government-appointed (a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether the CEO was appointed by the government).
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but because it makes it more likely for any firm’s clients to buy from a closer substitute.
Such a natural exclusion restriction makes the number of consumers a good instrumental
variable for the competition measure.25 One question in the SCE asks respondents about
the percentage of the firm’s clients (in terms of sales) that are located in the same city as
the firm. We construct our first instrument, Local Clients, accordingly.26
We exploit the intuition that any forces that drive more firms into an industry are nat-
ural candidates for instrumental variables. Although not shown explicitly in the model,
if the entry cost φ reduces, it weakly increases the number of firms entering the mar-
ket. Controlling for industry-city dummies and firm-level characteristics, what additional
measures would constitute a reduction of such an entry cost? Krugman and Venables
(1995) and Venables (1996) provide a hint. They show that the clustering of manufactur-
ers is positively correlated with that of their suppliers due to the vertical linkage. Nearby
suppliers facilitates the setup of business networks and distribution channels, making en-
try cheaper.27 Accordingly, we construct our second instrument, Local Suppliers, which is
the percentage of a firm’s suppliers (in terms of sales) that are located in the same city as
the firm.28
3.3 Empirical results
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 show that both instruments are positively and statistically
significantly correlated with the key explanatory variable (Competition). The Kleibergen-
Paap rk Lm statistic further confirms that the instruments are relevant, and the Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rk F statistic rules out the concern over weak instruments.
Column 1 also shows that Competition (being instrumented) has a positive and statis-
tically significant association with the degree of customization.
We include firm and CEO characteristics in Column 2. Although we believe that the
25Consistent with the rationale of this instrumental variable, Krugman (1991) shows that the clustering
of manufacturers is positively correlated with that of consumers due to the demand-supply linkage.
26The exact words in the World Bank survey are, “Measured by sales, where are the purchasers of the
products in your main business line located: (1) In the same district as your plant; (2) Outside your district
but in the same city area as your plant.” Our measure is the sum of these two percentages.
27We do not intend to rule out the possibility that more nearby suppliers lower the marginal cost of pro-
duction. But our model has shown that the crucial result that competition leads to customization does not
hinge on assuming a positive marginal cost of production. Therefore, lowering the marginal cost down to
zero does not alter our central theoretical prediction. One can also envision that adding a positive marginal
cost in a standard Hotelling model does not alter the fact that differentiation drives a wedge between the
marginal cost and the price the firms charge.
28The exact words in the World Bank survey are, “Measured by expenditures, where are your plant’s
suppliers located? Please give the percentage between the following 4 locations: (1) In the same district as
your plant; (2) Outside your district but in the same city area as your plant.” Our measure is the sum of
these two percentages.
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Table 3: Customization and Competition: Instrumental Variable Estimation
1 2 3 4 5 6
IV 2nd stage OLS IV 1st stage
Dep. Var. Custom-made Competition
Competition 0.202* 0.227* 0.121*** 0.129***
[0.118] [0.118] [0.032] [0.034]
Firm characteristics
Firm Size 0.001 -0.003 -0.020***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.007]
Firm Age -0.003 0.002 -0.021
[0.019] [0.020] [0.016]
Private Ownership 0.028 0.032 0.013
[0.032] [0.034] [0.025]
Labor Productivity 0.007 0.006 -0.005
[0.008] [0.008] [0.006]
Skilled Labor -0.118 -0.149 -0.021
[0.200] [0.215] [0.206]
Client Contract 0.046 0.05 0.047
[0.056] [0.058] [0.031]
CEO characteristics
CEO Education 0.003 0.002 -0.003
[0.006] [0.006] [0.004]
CEO Tenure 0.003 0.004 0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Deputy CEO Previously 0.041 0.044 0.023
[0.026] [0.026] [0.018]
Government Cadre Previously 0.041 0.067 0.074
[0.063] [0.068] [0.054]
Party Member -0.05 -0.051 -0.013
[0.031] [0.032] [0.020]
Government-appointed 0.024 0.019 -0.019
[0.029] [0.030] [0.024]
Instruments
Local Clients 0.375*** 0.354***
[0.034] [0.035]
Local Suppliers 0.122*** 0.123***
[0.029] [0.033]
Industry-city dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,437 1,338 1,437 1,338 1,437 1,338
R-squared 0.202 0.22
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 99.51*** 86.09***
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 35.16 33.74
Hansen’s J statistic 2.454 1.453
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.117 0.228
Mean[standard deviation]
Custom-made 0.406 0.405 0.406 0.405
[0.417] [0.416] [0.417] [0.416]
Competition 0.273 0.274 0.273 0.274
[0.335] [0.334] [0.335] [0.334]
Corresponding estimate of Competition 0.900*** 1.039* 0.552*** 0.598***
by fractional logit [0.306] [0.570] [0.129] [0.192]
White-robust standard errors clustered at the industry-city level are reported in brackets. *, **, and ***
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. A constant term is included in
all regressions, but the results are not reported to save space. Columns 5 and 6 are the first-stage results
of the corresponding estimation in columns 1 and 2, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 are the OLS results of
the corresponding estimation in columns 1 and 2, respectively. The bottom row presents estimate using
fractional logit; standard errors are boostrapped.
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small-sized nature of the firms in our data renders it difficult for an individual firm’s
characteristics to influence the location choice of its clients and suppliers, the additional
control of firm and CEO characteristics can help us validate our argument and improve
estimation efficiency. As can be seen in Column 2, the estimated coefficient of Competition
remains positive and statistically significant.
In terms of economic significance, Column 2 suggests that a one standard deviation
increase in Competition is associated with an 0.227×0.334 = 7.58% increase in the percent-
age of custom-made products/services, or 18.72% and 18.23% relative to the mean and
standard deviation, respectively, of Custom-made.
The corresponding OLS estimations are reported in Columns 3 and 4. The estimated
coefficients of Competition are always positive and statistically significant, and their size
remains relatively stable across the two specifications. Given the relevance of the control
variables, these results suggest that omitted variables are unlikely to severely bias our
findings.
Since our dependent variable Custom-made is a ratio, whenever possible, we also re-
port the estimated coefficient of Competition for the column’s corresponding fractional
logit estimation. If a column uses instruments, we follow Wooldridge (2012) in imple-
menting the corresponding instrumental variable fractional logit estimation. The results,
as reported in the bottom row, are consistent with our linear estimates.
3.3.1 Validity checks on the instruments
The validity of GMM estimation relies on the exclusion restriction, which means that the
two instruments can affect the outcome variable (Custom-made) only through the endoge-
nous variable (Competition). While our model suggests that their exclusion restriction
would hold, the possibility that they may fail to hold in our empirical implementation
matters. With the inclusion of industry and city dummies, the possible correlation be-
tween the instrumental variables and the error term υfic in equation (9) stems largely
from firm-level characteristics. Given the small-sized nature of the sample firms, it is dif-
ficult to see how an individual firm could influence the location decisions of its clients
and suppliers. A consistent pattern comes from the Hansen J statistic, which fails to be
significant. The additional inclusion of firm and CEO characteristics also does not affect
our estimated coefficient of Competition in the GMM regression much.
Perhaps being close to suppliers and clients directly reduces the cost of customization,
making firms more likely to customize their product. This concern would violate the in-
struments’ exclusion restriction. To address this concern, we include several variables in
the regression to control for the oft-mentioned channels through which our instrumental
22
variables may affect the outcome variable rather than through market competition. On
the supplier side, one potential concern is that the clustering of suppliers might lead to
increased availability of customized components, which in turn positively affects firms’
incentives to produce customized goods. It is also possible that a firm’s ability to cus-
tomize its products relies on the speed of receiving its supplies, which is related to the
degree of local suppliers. The SCE contains two questions (one asking each firm whether
its two major components are uniquely supplied to it, and the other asking each firm how
many times a year it gets a delivery of its two main inputs), which allows us to construct
two control variables (denoted Custom-made Components and Delivery Speed, respectively)
to address these two concerns.
On the client side, three potential concerns are that the number of years that a firm
has done business with its clients, the percentage of its products used in its clients’ pro-
duction process, and the clients’ ability to inspect the quality of good on sight may affect
both its location and customization strategies. To address these concerns, from the SCE
data, we construct five dummies (denoted Client Duration Dummies) to account for five
different business durations with clients (i.e., less than one year, one to two years, two to
three years, three to four years, and more than four years), a variable Product Warranty
(measured by the percentage of a firm’s products having warranties) to account for the
product quality, and a variable Production Process (measured by the percentage of a firm’s
output used in its clients’ production process) to account for the degree of vertical linkage.
As shown in Column 1 of Table 4, controlling for all these additional sets of variables
has little impact on our estimation results.29
We conduct another test based on a unique business feature of China. Some firms in
the data are engaged in business with the government (i.e., 301 of the 1,509 firms).30 In
China, however, personal connections (guanxi), rather than market competitiveness, are
critical in determining whether a firm could engage in business with the government. We
can therefore exploit the intuition that a firm should respond to increased competition by
being more customized only if it faces market competition. If competition is an important
driver of customization, those firms who sell to the government should not have their
customization scope correlated significantly with market competition. Accordingly, we
divide the entire sample according to whether or not a firm has business with the gov-
ernment, and we check whether the estimate of β for the former sub-sample is smaller or
29The economic significance are similar to that of Column 2 of Table 3. A one standard deviation increase
in Competition is associated with a 7.01% increase in the percentage of custom-made products/services, or
17.3% and 16.85% relative to the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of Custom-made.
30The exact words in the World Bank survey are: “What is the share of sales to the government?” 301
firms answered a positive share.
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even insignificant.
The estimation results are reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.31 As expected,
the sub-sample of firms that do business with the government have an insignificant β.
Consistent with our intuition, the estimated coefficient of Competition for the sub-sample
of firms with government business dealings loses its statistical significance and becomes
negative, whereas it remains positive and statistically significant for those not selling to
the government.32
The corresponding estimates using instrumental variable fractional logit as in Wooldridge
(2012) do not show inconsistent pattern. These results suggest that increased competition
is significantly associated with a larger share of custom-made sales.
3.4 Robustness
Imperfect IV estimation. Despite the inclusion of a long list of control variables and several
validity checks, we can never rule out the possibility that our instruments and the error
term are correlated. Instead of arguing the exogeneity of the instruments, we build upon
recent developments in the imperfect instrumental variable literature to conduct further
robustness checks. Specifically, Nevo and Rosen (2012) show that in the case of the instru-
ment (W ) being correlated with the error term but to a lesser degree than the regressor of
interest (X), V (λ) ≡ σxW − λσzX is uncorrelated with the error term and thus becomes a
valid instrument. While σx (the standard deviation ofX) and σz can be readily calculated,
λ ≡ ρWε/ρXu ∈ [0, 1] can never be figured out. In the benchmark, we pick λ = 0.85 (the de-
tails of selection are given in the Appendix) but experiment with λ = 0.75, 0.80, 0.90, and
0.95. As shown in Columns 1 to 5 of Table 5, the two-step GMM estimation using these
newly constructed instruments consistently produces positive and statistically significant
estimates.
Outliers. Performing an initial screening based on Cook’s distance > 1 to eliminate
gross outliers and then performing Huber iterations followed by bi-weight iterations (Li,
1985), we find that the process does not drop any observations. We therefore hold the
view that outliers cannot be a major concern.
Alternative competition measure. We use the log of the total amount of employment for
31The OLS estimation results, which are available upon request, exhibits a similar pattern.
32The economic significance of Column 2 of Table 4 is: a one standard deviation increase in Competition
is associated with a 9.52% decrease in the percentage of custom-made products/services, or 28.33% and
25.12% relative to the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of Custom-made. The economic signifi-
cance of Column 3 of Table 4 is: a one standard deviation increase in Competition is associated with a 8.7%
increase in the percentage of custom-made products/services, or 20.62% and 20.57% relative to the mean
and standard deviation, respectively, of Custom-made.
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Table 4: Instrument Checks: (Dep. var.: Custom-made)
1 2 3
Sample Full Government sales?
Yes No
Competition 0.215* -0.311 0.256**
[0.126] [0.299] [0.130]
Custom-made Components 0.113
[0.075]
Delivery Speed 0
[0.000]
Production Process 0.073*
[0.038]
Product Warranty 0.161*
[0.095]
Client Duration Dummies Yes
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Industry-city dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,116 267 1,045
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 73.4*** 9.637*** 69.89***
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 32.14 14.69 28.52
Hansen’s J statistic 1.432 0.251 0.343
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.231 0.616 0.558
Mean[standard deviation]
Custom-made 0.406 0.336 0.422
[0.416] [0.379] [0.423]
Competition 0.263 0.241 0.283
[0.326] [0.306] [0.340]
Corresponding estimate of Competition 0.998** -0.763 1.254***
by fractional logits [0.436] [-0.810] [0.459]
White-robust standard errors clustered at the industry-city level are re-
ported in brackets. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. A constant term is included in all re-
gressions, but the results are not reported to save space. The bottom row
presents estimate using fractional logit; standard errors are boostrapped.
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other firms in the same industry within the same city as an alternative measure. Control-
ling for the industry and city dummies and the firm’s own employment size, the larger
this measure is relative to other firms within the same industry-city, the more manpower
is employed by nearby rivals. While our main measure is one that gauges rivals’ outputs
(sales), this measure gauges rivals’ inputs. It, however, does not capture all inputs (e.g.,
machinery). It nevertheless is reported by other firms, in contrast to the main measure,
which is self-reported. Column 6 of Table 5 shows this alternative has a positive and
statistically significant estimated coefficient.
Local market. To address the concern that our market competition measure may capture
the degree of local competition poorly (due to the geographic proximity of the market),
we focus on a sub-sample of firms where the majority of sales are made locally (i.e., in the
same city). As shown in Column 7 of Table 5, our findings are robust to this sub-sample.
The corresponding instrumental variable fractional logit estimation does not generate in-
consistent pattern.
Reverse causality. Even if we obtain a consistent and unbiased estimate of β, it is still
possible that the positive impact of competition on customization simply reflects the sort-
ing of firms across locations, i.e., firms with a higher degree of customization locate in
more competitive areas.
Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, it is difficult for us to rule out this “dy-
namic” concern completely. We further exploit the data by comparing firms that recently
moved to the surveyed city with those that have been there for a long time. If the esti-
mated coefficients of β are similar across these two samples, then such a reverse causality
is unlikely to be a major concern in our analysis. One question in the SCE asks whether
the firm recently relocated from another city. As only a fraction of the firms answered in
the affirmative, it is not sensible to divide the full sample into two based on firms’ answer
to this question and to compare the two estimated coefficients of β. Instead, we compare
the estimated coefficient of β for the subset of firms answering “no” to this question with
that for the whole sample.
Column 8 of Table 5 shows the estimation on the sub-sample that excludes firms that
recently relocated from another city to the survey city. The estimated coefficient of Com-
petition remains positive and statistically significant, and its magnitude is in the neigh-
borhood of that of the estimated coefficient for the full sample. The corresponding instru-
mental variable fractional logit estimation does not generate inconsistent pattern. Reverse
causality, therefore, does not seem to be strong enough in driving our results.
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4 Conclusion
Relative to standardized products, customized products tend to be less subject to price
competition. We formalize this idea in a model that predicts that increased competition
leads to a larger share of sales for customized products.
We present empirical evidence on this prediction using a World Bank survey on Chi-
nese firms. This data set provides rare and unique firm-level measures of the extent of
customization and the competition intensity they face. Compared with the previous evi-
dence on customization, this data set provides a direct measure of customization for firms
across all industries. Our results suggest that relative to firms of similar caliber within the
same industry located in the same city, those firms that face more intense competition
have a significantly higher share of sales from their customized products.
Having shown the rationale and relevance of customization, there remain quite a few
interesting questions to be probed. For example, the relative importance of customiza-
tion to other strategies when facing increased competition remains to be seen. Also, the
propensity to customize when facing increased competition may depend on the nature
of the industry, as hinted by the wide variation in the share of customized sales across
industries shown in Table 1. If for a particular industry, firms are more likely to cus-
tomize, then increased competition will have a smaller negative effect on the performance
(profits, survival rates, etc.) of the firms in this industry. Moreover, consumers or down-
stream buyers may benefit from such increased competition because more customized
products are provided to them. Therefore, such difference in propensity to customize
across industries may be an important reference for discretionary and differential compe-
tition/liberalization policy, e.g., trade liberalization or privatization.
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Appendix
Robustness of Proposition 1
The main results as stated in Proposition 1 are actually robust to various extensions of
the basic model. Here, we show three different cases. For clarity, we conduct the analysis
by varying one assumption at a time and keeping the rest of the setup the same as in the
basic model. We set D = 1 for ease of presentation.
Marginal cost of production We consider incorporating variable cost in the form of a
constant marginal cost a+δ ≥ 0, where a ≥ 0 is the marginal cost of producing standardized
products, and δ ≥ 0 allows for the possibility that customized products are more costly to
produce. First, suppose δ = 0. As the pricing of customized products is still pxA = p
G
A + tx,
the profit function viewed at Stage 3 (3) should be rewritten as
piA(p
G
A; p
G
B) =
(
1
2n
− p
G
A − pGB
2t
)(
pGA − a
)
+
∫ sA
0
txdx.
The profit-maximizing solution entails p̂GA
(
pGB
)
= 1
2
(
pGB +
t
n
+ a
)
and p̂GB
(
pGA
)
= 1
2
(
pGA +
t
n
+ a
)
.
The equilibrium price pair is thus
(
t
n
+ a, t
n
+ a
)
.
Now, consider δ > 0. That is, customized products are more costly to produce. Again,
in equilibrium, pxA = p
G
A + tx still holds. However, firm A offers a customized product
to x if and only if pxA − a − δ ≥ pGA − a, which is equivalent to x ≥ δ/t. That is, only the
standardized products are offered to consumers who are located relatively close to the
firms if customized products are more costly to produce. The profit function viewed at
Stage 3 is
piA(p
G
A; p
G
B) =
[
x˜−
(
sA − δ
t
)] (
pGA − a
)
+
∫ sA
δ
t
(pxA − a− δ) dx
=
(
1
2n
− p
G
A − pGB
2t
)(
pGA − a
)
+
ts2A
2
+
δ2
2t
− δsA.
Hence, the pricing under δ > 0 is the same as the case where δ = 0. The profit function
viewed at Stage 2 is
pii (si) = p
G
i
[
x˜−
(
si − δ
t
)]
+
∫ si
δ
t
(
pGi + tx
)
dx− ax˜− δ
(
si − δ
t
)
− C (si) (10)
=
t
2n2
+
ts2i
2
+
δ2
2t
− δsi − C (si) .
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The condition that determines s∗i becomes ts∗i − δ = c (s∗i ). That is, δ > 0 reduces the
marginal benefit of customization at the product s∗i compared with the case of δ = 0, and
this reduces the scope of customization s∗i .33 Nonetheless, the determination of s∗i is still
unaffected by n. The share of customized sales is the second term divided by the first two
terms in (10):
r =
∫ si
δ
t
(
t
n
+ a+ tx
)
dx(
t
n
+ a
) [
1
2n
− (si − δt )]+ ∫ siδ
t
(
t
n
+ a+ tx
)
dx
=
2n
(
si − δt
)
(t2 + atn) + t2n2s2i − δ2n2
t2 + atn+ t2n2s2i − δ2n2
.
Given that s∗i <
1
2n
continues to hold as the s∗i here is less than that in the basic model, it
is then straightforward to verify that Proposition 1 holds.
Timeline It is reasonable that the entry stage comes first and that consumers choose
between standardized products and customized products only when both types of prod-
ucts are presented to them with prices announced. However, we ask whether the results are
robust to the changes in timing of customization.
First, suppose customization is determined at the same time as all the prices. Note the
analysis in Section 2.2.1 is unchanged, for that analyzes how prices are determined given
customization scope si. The question now is how si’s are determined given these prices.
For firm A, this is simply subtracting C (sA) from (3), i.e., the previous Stage 3 profits, and
firm A chooses pGA and sA simultaneously to maximize:
piA(p
G
A, sA; p
G
B) = (x˜− sA) pGA +
∫ sA
0
pxAdx− C (sA)
=
[
1
2n
− p
G
A − pGB
2t
]
pGA +
∫ sA
0
txdx− C (sA) . (11)
The first-order conditions of this problem for pGA and sA remain the same as in the basic
model, and so do all the results. The key here is that in both the basic model and this
variant the first-order conditions for customization scopes do not involve the prices of
the standardized products and vice versa.
Now, suppose instead that sA and the prices pxA are determined given prices of stan-
dardized products. In this case, profits are only realized after the customization decisions
are made since that is when the consumers are presented with all the options. The equi-
librium price of a customized good is again px = pGA + tx, and the profit function (11)
applies again even though we should replace piA(pGA, sA; p
G
B) with piA(sA; p
G
A, p
G
B). The fact
33Note that to ensure a positive s∗i satisfying ts
∗
i − δ = c (s∗i ) still entails a maximal profit, δ could not be
too large.
32
that the first-order conditions for customization scopes do not involve the prices of the
standardized products and vice versa again ensures that all results are the same as in the
basic model.
Bargaining on customization In the basic model we have assumed that consumers are
price-takers. What if consumers do not take prices as given and instead bargain with the firms?
Say, when it comes to customization, the firms need to acquire some information from the
consumers and hence consumers may naturally possess some bargaining power. Suppose
that firms and consumers bargain when the firms would like to offer a customized prod-
uct and that Nash’s bargaining solution applies. Such a solution, as is well-known, can
be approximately implemented by some sort of bargaining game with alternating offers.
As the disagreement outcome here is that the consumers simply purchase a standard-
ized product, the total gains from a customization deal are tx. Suppose the firm’s bar-
gaining power is β ∈ (0, 1). Then, pxA = pGA + βtx. Hence, the profit function viewed at
Stage 3 is
piA(p
G
A; p
G
B, sA) =
[
1
2n
− p
G
A − pGB
2t
− sA
]
pGA+
∫ sA
0
(
pGA + βtx
)
dx =
[
1
2n
− p
G
A − pGB
2t
]
pGA+β
∫ sA
0
txdx.
Hence, pricing of standardized products are unaffected. The profit function viewed at
Stage 2 is
pii (si) =
t
2n2
+
βts2i
2
− C (si) ,
which implies that the optimal s∗i satisfies βts∗i = c (si). Again, the determination of s∗i
is independent of n, and hence Proposition 1 holds. The basic model is simply a case in
which β → 1 (consumers have zero bargaining power). With a β < 1, customization scope
s∗i is smaller than that in the basic model, as firms’ smaller bargaining power reduces
their incentives to customize. In fact, from (8) one sees that β’s role is isomorphic to that
of market size D. Therefore, a larger β implies a larger s∗i , a larger n, and the share of
customized sales increases.
Proof of Proposition 2
Here, we provide a complete derivation leading to Proposition 2.
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Equilibrium given n and realization of x
In Stage 3, given prices pGi , i ∈ {A,B}, the large client’s utility of purchasing from A and
B are D
(
v − tx− pGA
)
and D
[
v − t ( 1
n
− x)− pGB], respectively. This implies a price war
between two firms in a Bertrand fashion. With zero marginal cost, the lowest price B can
charge is 0. The equilibrium limit pricing by firm A implies that
pGA = t
(
1
n
− 2x
)
, piGA = Dt
(
1
n
− 2x
)
,
where piGA is firm A’s profit.
In Stage 2, whatever can be achieved by bargaining with firm B can be achieved by
bargaining with firm A. Thus, in equilibrium, bargaining only occurs between the large
client and firm A. In any customization deal, c (x) has to be paid by firm A, and the large
client can obtain a utility of D (v − pxA). As the disagreement outcome is given by Stage
3’s equilibrium outcome, Nash’s bargaining solution is given by the pxA that gives each
player half of the total gains from customization, that is,
D (v − pxA)−D
(
v − tx− pGA
)
=
1
2
[
Dv −D (v − tx− pGA)− c (x)− piGA] = 12 [Dtx− c (x)] .
Thus,
pxA =
c (x)
2D
+
t
2
(
2
n
− 3x
)
.
Such a deal involving pxA will only be reached if and only if the total gain from customiza-
tion is nonnegative, i.e., if and only if c (x) ≤ Dtx. In other words, when the cost of
customization is too big either due to a costly technology c (.) or due to a large x, then it
is not worthwhile to reach a customization deal.
Share of sales of customized product
Given n firms and realization of x, the large client either purchase a customized product or
a standardized one, but not both. However, the realizations of the random variable x can
be interpreted as different (niche) markets or a market at different times. Thus, we exploit
this nature to proxy the share of customized sales by the expected sales of customized
product relative to the total sales. Without prior information of x and with even spacing, x
is uniformly distributed on
[
0, 1
2n
]
with density f (x) = 2n. Let xˆ be such that c (xˆ) = Dtxˆ.
Recall that c (·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, and that c (0) = 0. Similar to the
analysis in the basic model, xˆ ∈ (0, 1
2n
)
is unique because c′ (0) < Dt and that c increases
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fast enough to ensure that c( 1
2n
) > Dt
2n
. Note that the share of customized sales r increases if
and only if the ratio of customized sales to standardized sales, which is called r˜, increases.
Observe that
r˜ =
∫ xˆ
0
pxADf (x) dx∫ 1
2n
xˆ
pGADf (x) dx
=
∫ xˆ
0
pxAdx∫ 1
2n
xˆ
pGAdx
=
1
2Dt
∫ xˆ
0
c (x) dx+ xˆ
n
− 3xˆ2
4(
1
2n
− xˆ)2 .
First, consider an exogenous increase in n. Then, since parameters are not changed, xˆ is
unaffected by this increase in n.
∂r˜
∂n
= −
2
[
Dtxˆ (2 + nxˆ) + 2n
∫ xˆ
0
c (x) dx
]
Dt (2nxˆ− 1)3 > 0.
Thus, an increase in competition increases r˜. Now, consider an increase in n resulted
from an increase in the market size D. First observe that dr˜
dD
= ∂r˜
∂n
dn
dD
+ ∂r˜
∂xˆ
dxˆ
dD
+ ∂r˜
∂D
. Since
∂r˜
∂n
dn
dD
> 0, it suffices to show that ∂r˜
∂xˆ
dxˆ
dD
+ ∂r˜
∂D
≥ 0. Observe that dxˆ
dD
= txˆ
c′(xˆ)−Dt . Thus,
∂r˜
∂xˆ
dxˆ
dD
+
∂r˜
∂D
= 2n×
{
Dtxˆ [Dt (2 + nxˆ) + n (1− 2nxˆ) c (xˆ)] + n ∫ xˆ
0
c (x) dx [Dt (1 + 2nxˆ) + (2nxˆ− 1) c′ (xˆ)]
}
D2t (2nxˆ− 1)3 (Dt− c′ (xˆ)) .
The strict convexity of c implies that c′ (xˆ) > Dt. Thus, ∂r˜
∂xˆ
dxˆ
dD
+ ∂r˜
∂D
> 0 if and only if
Dtxˆ [Dt (2 + nxˆ) + n (1− 2nxˆ) c (xˆ)] + n
∫ xˆ
0
c (x) dx [Dt (1 + 2nxˆ) + (2nxˆ− 1) c′ (xˆ)] > 0.
If c (x) = xb with b > 1, then with c (xˆ) = xˆb = Dtxˆ, the above becomes
2 (b+ 1) + n (b+ 1) (1− 2nxˆ) xˆ+ 2nxˆ+ 2 (b+ 1)n2xˆ2 > 0,
which is true.
Selection of the benchmark value of λ
We can write the error term as υfic ≡ ωfic + υ˜fic, where ωfic is our omitted variable that
is potentially correlated with our regressor of interest (Competitionfic; relabelled as Xfic
for convenience) and our instrumental variables (Local Clientsfic and Local Suppliersfic;
relabelled as Wfic), while υ˜fic is uncorrelated with Xfic and Wfic. The OLS estimator of
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equation (9) takes the following form:
βOLS = β + ψXωθY ω, (12)
where β is the true value; ψXω is the regression coefficient of X on ω; and θY ω is the regres-
sion coefficient of our outcome variable (Custom-madefic; relabelled as Yfic) on ω.
Suppose there is no true relationship between Custom-made and Competition such that
β = 0. Then βOLS = ψXωθY ω. In other words, the positive findings in the OLS regressions
reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 are all due to the omitted variable ω. Given
βOLS = 0.121 Column 3, we have ψXωθY ω = 0.121.
Doing the same set of regressions for W and making the same assumption that the
estimated coefficients of the instruments purely reflect the effects of the omitted vari-
able ω, we have χWωθY ω = 0.104. Given that λ ≡ ρWε/ρXu = χWω/ψXω, we have
λ = 0.104/0.121 = 0.8595. Thus, we round to 0.85 in the benchmark. However, in princi-
ple, we can never figure out the true λ as by definition, omitted variables are something
we do not have handy. We therefore experiment with different values of λ too.
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